Introduction
When the U.S. were actively engaged in the presidential race, a poll on the U.S. election was conducted by WIN/Gallup International Association. The poll, carried out among 45 countries, showed that Hillary Clinton was ahead of Donald Trump in every country but one, Nevertheless, not only did the U.S. presidential election draw the attention of the Russian media, but Russia also was a key topic of the U.S. election discussion. For instance, a Fox News Poll of
May 2017 found 44% of Americans think Russia attempted to influence the presidential election to help Trump 7 .
One can assume that the media played a very significant role in attracting attention to the U.S. election and Trump's victory in both countries (Kazun, 2017; McCombs & Shaw, 1972 , 1993 . A presidential election is an unobtrusive issue (Demers, Craff, Choi, & Pessin, 1989; McCombs, Graber, & Weaver, 1981) : the media can be a basis for forming public opinion since the population has no experience of interpersonal communication with the candidates. When it comes to a foreign election campaign, the mass media is the only source of information. The important role of the media in shaping public opinion on the U.S. election in Russia is confirmed by the fact that, at the very beginning of the election campaign, most Russians knew little if anything about the candidates. In July 2016, 60% of Russians knew nothing about Trump 8 , and
after just a few months many of them were celebrating his victory.
But do U.S. presidential elections always attract the attention of Russians? Perhaps, such events are traditionally widely covered in Russia's international news, since the U.S. is the largest economy (Wu, 2007) , has a large population (Rosengren, 1974) , and has great political influence (Blondheim, Segev, & Cabrera, 2015) /24/2012-god-v-otsenkah-rossiyansobytiya-persony/] 4 victory in 2016 were considered to be significant by an approximately equal number of Russians. While people's attention to the election of the president of their own country is logical, their comparable interest in foreign news seems less so.
We assume that since the media in Russia are not completely state-independent (Fredheim, 2016; Gehlbach, 2010) , they designed the agenda promoted by the political elite, giving such wide coverage to the 2016 U.S. election. Therefore, the intensity of Trump-related discussions in the Russian media may reflect not so much the interest of the people as the position of the Russian authorities towards Trump.
In Russia, as in other countries, the media play an important role in the deproblematization of certain issues (Ibarra & Kitsuse, 2003) , for example, economic sanctions (Kazun, 2016) or tragedies, such as mass poisoning with surrogate alcohol (Kazun, Kazun, 2017) . We assume that the discussion= about the presidency of Donald Trump could play a similar role. Moreover, the portrayal of the U.S. as an opponent or an ally in particular cases in the Russian press has traditionally influenced public opinion (Petersson & Persson, 2010; Gerber, 2015) . Trump's victory and his further actions against Russia were not something predictable for the Russian authorities, therefore, we assume that the tone of the discussions in the media should have changed significantly immediately after the election, and seven months later.
This work provides the first systematic analysis of Trump-related discussions in the Russian media. Some attempts to describe the features of the U.S. election coverage by the Russian media were based primarily on qualitative data and indicated that the tone of the topic was predominantly positive before the election (Slutsky & Gavra, 2017) . However, based on quantitative data, we show that the actual Russian press coverage of Trump's activities was far more complex and not necessarily positive. We pay attention to the intensity of the discussion and the tone of the articles on Trump in the Russian press, and draw conclusions on how his position changed in the network coverage.
Literature Review
The media's attention to political events in their own country is natural. Such news is relevant to their citizens and can significantly affect their lives; media attention to foreign events seems less clear. Why would foreign news also attract public attention? On what factors does such interest depend?
Factors determining the number of references to a particular country in international news include the country's characteristics, such as its economic and political power, relations with other countries and perceived economic and political instability (Blondheim, Segev, & Cabrera, 5 2015) . A country's place in the world news agenda has much to do with its size and political influence, economy (Wu, 2007) , military potential (Shenhav, Rahat, & Sheafer, 2012) and population (Rosengren, 1974) . International contacts and proximity to other countries are also important. For instance, geographical (Chang, Shoemaker, & Brendlinger, 1987) or cultural (Lee, 2007; Rosengren, 1974) remoteness can lower media interest in a country. Media attention also depends on bilateral trade relations between countries and the nature of the event covered (Shoemaker, Danielian, & Brendlinger, 1991) . This naturally higher interest in domestic issues results in a number of countries getting no international media coverage (Horvit, Gade, & Lance, 2013) . However, the U.S., being a large and influential country, is at the center of global news flow; events there are actively discussed by the international media (Segev, 2015) .
In addition, international media coverage of political processes often leads to greater attention being paid to the activities of political leaders, compared to the attention paid to political parties and organizations (Balmas & Sheafer, 2013; Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Van Aelst, Sheafer, & Stanyer, 2012) . It seems logical that Trump and Clinton attracted a great deal of attention from the Russian media during the 2016 U.S. election. The place of the U.S. in the global system and the political personalization of discussions may have led to an active discussion of the presidential candidates in Russia. Moreover, such features of political processes media coverage may influence foreign public opinion in this country (Entman, 2008) .
The other side of political personalization is the media's attention to the personality traits of individual politicians. Such traits as charisma (Pancer, Brown, & Barr, 1999; Sheafer, 2001) , visual appearance (Tsfati, Markowitz Elfassi, & Waismel-Manor, 2010; Waismel-Manor & Tsfati, 2011) , and vigorousness (Aaldering & Vliegenthart, 2016) , may be as important to the media as their professional skills (Bean, 1993) . Therefore, the attention paid to Trump by the U.S. media, which did not correspond with the results of pre-election polls, usually legitimizing the front-runner (Lawrence & Boydstun, 2017) , can be explained by his personal characteristics.
The candidate's active use of new media could also play a role (Groshek & Koc-Michalska, 2017; McGregor & Mourão, 2017 ).
This study is based on the agenda-setting theory, according to which the media has a significant impact on what people consider to be important events (Dearing & Rogers, 1996; McCombs, 2014) . This concept was first formulated on the basis of data from the 1968 U.S. presidential election campaign, when researchers revealed a correlation between the public's perceptions of the most significant issues in the candidates' programs and the frequency with which these issues were mentioned in the media (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) . The idea was further confirmed by numerous and varied empirical examples (Ader, 1995; Feeley, O'Mally, & Covert, 2016; Iyengar & Simon, 1993; Weaver, McCombs, & Spellman, 1975) .
However, agenda-setting hypotheses have not only been tested in a variety of empirical contexts, but they have also been modified (McCombs, Shaw, & Weaver, 2014) . A complement to the idea of the impact of discussions in the media on the perception of the importance of issues, is how the emphasis on certain characteristics of a situation or a public figure would form a public opinion (Wanta, Golan, & Lee, 2004) . This development of the theory was called second-level agenda-setting. The concept of agenda-building focuses on awareness-raising activities of interest groups (Vonbun-Feldbauer & Matthes, 2017) , including national leaders (Wanta, 1991) and large corporations (Carroll & McCombs, 2003) . Therefore, the discussion of the U.S. election in the Russian media could be deliberately designed by individual interest groups.
To indicate the place of a certain issue on the agenda and its relationship with other issues, the network agenda model (the third level of agenda setting) can be applied, according to which objects (events, public figures) or their characteristics are interconnected in the public mind . The first academic article which analyzes network agenda was published in 2012 and described the traits attributed to the Texas gubernatorial election candidates (Guo, 2012) . It concluded that the online media agenda must be connected with the social agenda, i.e. links between the problems built by the mass media will be at least partly reproduced in public opinion.
The first studies of network agenda were local in nature and based on a relatively small number of analysis units, whereas subsequently the method was applied at a national level.
Researchers analyzed media and social attention to ten key problems faced by society, including economics, politics, national security, environmental protection, and the interconnections among these problems (Vu, Guo, & McCombs, 2014) . Attempts were made to study network agenda in China, as a country with limited media freedom (Cheng, 2016; Cheng & Chan, 2015) .
Nevertheless, the most promising are the comparative studies of network agenda. An example of such studies is the comparison of the candidates of the 2012 U.S. presidential election (Guo & Vargo, 2015; Kiousis et al., 2015) , which demonstrated the difference in issue ownership (Hayes, 2008; Petrocik, Benoit, & Hansen, 2003; Walgrave, Lefevere, & Nuytemans, 2009 ) for Obama and Romney and changes in the way people linked candidates with different issues after the presidential campaign. In addition, studies were carried out comparing the network agendas on one issue in different countries and in different types of media (Kazun, Kazun, 2017) . This study carries out a comparative analysis of Trump's position in the Russian press network agenda at different times.
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Methodology
This study analyzes Trump's position on the Russian press network agenda in three periods: one month before the election (October 9, 2016-November 8, 2016), a month after the election (November 9, 2016-December 9, 2016) and 7 months after the election (June 1, 2017-June 30, 2017). The last period of analysis ends before the meeting of Trump and Putin, in order to avoid its impact on the network agenda.
The network agenda for each of the periods was based on the Integrum database, which contains about 500 Russian magazines and over 250 national newspapers. This study focuses on the discussion in the federal print media, since they are the ones that form the agenda. The sample of articles was performed using 23 keywords (network attributes), including pre-election issues, the U.S. internal agenda, international issues, and topics meaningful for Russian interests.
The choice of analysis points is based on their relevance to the political agenda of the U.S. and Russia. Networks were build using matrixes of A x A format. Each cell of the matrix reflects the number of times when two network attributes were mentioned simultaneously. Since the direction of attribute connections is irrelevant to our analysis, the network is symmetrical.
The networks include 53,269, 63,679, and 36,000 connections (joint mentions of keywords) for periods before the election, after the election, and 7 months after the election results. The distance between different network points is calculated using an algorithm that considers the strength of the connections among different network nodes. The more often attributes are mentioned together, the closer to each other they are located. The thickness and length of the lines show the strength of connections among different topics, calculated as the number of joint mentions in the print media. A degree centrality indicator was calculated for each network attribute, reflecting the number of connections with other attributes. Degree centrality shows the extent to which any given event is integrated in the context of discussions of other issues.
Additionally, the results of public opinion polls on the U.S. election and Trump carried out by the three leading Russian public opinion research companies (WCIOM, FOM, Levada Center) were used. Data from Medialogia 10 , a company aggregating news from 40,000 Russianlanguage media, including 2,040 print newspapers, were used for the discussion sentiment analysis. The tone of article (positive, negative or neutral) is determined by automated text processing. Medialogia manually checks the algorithm for 1% of news messages to control its correct operation.
Results
The U.S. election in the Russian media
To begin with, it is important to see whether the 2016 U.S. presidential election coverage differed from that of previous elections in the Russian press, or whether a great deal of attention to such events is typical for Russia (see Figure 1) . The Russian media have followed a similar election-reporting pattern in previous elections, paying equal attention to both U.S. presidential candidates (at least in quantitative terms). However, the 2016 election was covered in more detail than two previous U.S.
presidential elections.
This attention to the U.S. election from the Russian media can be explained in various ways. The presidential candidates' personalities could have played a role. During the election campaign, Trump was repeatedly involved in scandals, which would attract additional attention from the population and the media (McManus, 1994) . Some studies point out that Trump received so much attention from the U.S. media because of his rhetorical strategies (Hart, 2017) and the way Trump stories performed an entertainment function (Lawrence & Boydstun, 2017 and Russian values could as well stimulate discussion on this issue (Shoemaker et al. 1991 ).
On the other hand, more important in attracting the attention of Russians to the U.S.
election could be the relationship between the two nations, which deteriorated sharply 13 after the annexation of the Crimea in March 2014 (Boyd-Barrett, 2015; Hopf, 2016; Teper, 2015) .
Russians were hopeful that Trump's presidency would help improve the relationship between the two countries. In July 2016, this opinion was shared by 34% of the population 14 . While the chance of Clinton becoming the next president was less encouraging: only 6% of Russians believed that the relationship between Russia and the U.S. would improve in this case, while 53% shared the opposite view 15 . Thus, the election results were considered to be important for Russia. It seems that better relations between the countries were the reason for a slightly reduced interest of Russians in the previous U.S. elections. The state, influencing the media in Russia, has played an important role in this case. It can be assumed that framing Trump as a friendly-toRussia presidential candidate could partly deproblematize the complex relationship between the two nations.
Russian public opinion of Trump
There is a widespread view in the media (Slutsky & Gavra, 2017) that Russia supported Trump in the U.S. election. Let us consider whether this is indeed the case with regard to public opinion polls.
During the U.S. election, several public opinion polls were carried out in Russia regarding the issue, such as the poll where Russians were asked to forecast the relationship between the two countries in the case of Trump's victory (see Table 1 ). After Trump was elected, in Russia, there was a situation similar to the honeymoon effect (Beckmann & Godfrey, 2007) Table 2 ). The proportion of Russians who claimed to have a positive attitude to Trump since summer 2016 has also grown a little (from 31% to 38%).
In January 2017, more than half the Russians (55%) noted that U.S. The attitude towards Trump improved slightly after his meeting with Putin on July 7, 2017, when the two leaders expressed hope for some improvement in cooperation between their countries. However, this effect on public opinion was brief, and by the end of July the level of trust dropped significantly (from 27% after the meeting to 18% at the end of the same month).
Public opinion polls show that Russians treated Trump quite well during the election campaign. After his victory, Russians considered him to be a friend until around March 2017.
However, he quickly lost this status six months after he was elected. Why did this happen? Since Russians themselves say that economic sanctions had a positive effect on the situation in Russia 17 , the change in the attitude towards Trump cannot be simply explained by some objective influence of his policies on the Russian economy. This is probably just the image that was designed and changed by the Russian media.
Tone of articles on the U.S. election in the Russian press
Contrary to what a recent study (Slutsky & Gavra, 2017) showed, according to our analysis, the tone of articles mentioning Trump before the election was more negative than positive: his balance rates have never exceeded zero (see Figure 2) 18 According to the Medialogia data, there were no traces of such changes when Barack Obama beat John McCain in 2008, although the latter was rather negative about Russia. The sentiment of the press remained predominantly neutral with respect to both candidates and didn't change much after the election results announcement. Positive news about Trump prevailed in the Russian media only for three months (see Figure 3) . In February 2017, the share of negative articles exceeded that of positive articles, and by June 2017 there were practically no positive publications about the new U.S. president.
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Partly, the greater number of negative stories about a president that was considered to be friendly to Russia, can be explained by the traditionally higher media attention to negative events and unfavorable changes (Blondheim, Segev, & Cabrera, 2015; Harrington, 1989; Leung & Lee, 2015; Shoemaker, 1996) . It may be concluded that the attitude of the Russian media towards Trump was not clearly positive: it was like this for only a few months after his victory. According to the network agenda theory, the connection of the issue being discussed with other salient issues is important.
Let us compare the context in which Trump was mentioned in the Russian press before, immediately after, and in the 7 months after the election, just before his meeting with Putin.
Trump-related discussion in the Russian media network agenda
In order to analyze the context of the discussions about Trump in the Russian press, we used network analysis (the results are shown in Figures 4, 5, and 7) . First of all, it was important to compare the nature of the discussions in the Russian media before and after the election. 
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election.
When comparing these two network agendas, several important conclusions can be drawn. Prior to the election, Trump had significantly less connections with the topic of sanctions than after the election. Before the election Trump was portrayed in the Russian press not as someone who could lift sanctions after and if he won, but as the opponent of Clinton, seen as the one who would most likely be the next U.S. president. (November 10, 2016, Moskovskij Komsomolets) .
If Clinton, who had negative ratings in Russia, had won, the Russian media could have used Trump's loss to explain why sanctions would not be lifted. Trump, whose ratings were a bit better, would be a useful loser. His defeat would be a good explanation for the continuing cold relations with the U.S., which had chilled after the annexation of Crimea. If Clinton, initially viewed as a candidate unfriendly to Russia, won, it would have legitimized the continuing tense relationship between the countries. However, Trump won, which raised the most natural topic for discussion -the possibility of lifting international sanctions against Russia -an issue that could only be real in the media, but in fact was hardly discussed by politicians.
"In just a week, investment funds targeting the Russian market attracted a record amount of funds since the introduction of sanctions in the summer of 2014 -more than $200 million.
Against the backdrop of expectations of potential warming of U.S.-Russia relations after Donald
Trump was elected president, this brought the Russian market to the front of the emerging markets." (November 26, 2016, Kommersant) A comparison of the joint mention of Clinton and Trump with their network attributes before the election shows that the latter had no preponderance on the Russian agenda (see Figure   6 ). This proves that Trump was not portrayed by the Russian media as a more important candidate than Clinton. The only significant difference between the network agendas of the two presidential candidates was the stronger connection of Clinton with scandalous issues -hackers and the FBI investigation. From a comparison of the network agendas before and after the election, it is clear that after the election, the Russian media began to separate Trump-related discussions from the issue of the hacking efforts aimed at the U.S. election, which were actively discussed in the U.S..
Before the election, the Russian media freely discussed hacker attacks in the context of the U.S. presidential election. This fits well with the change in Trump's portrayal by the media after his victory. If before the U.S. election, hacking attacks could be seen as another argument that deprived Clinton's success of legitimacy and explains the defeat of the-friend-of-Russia Trump, then after his victory, this issue began to contradict the agenda that was being formed. As a result, after Trump's victory, the Russian media preferred not to discuss hacking. It seems that this change in the discussion contributed to shaping public opinion on Russia's interference in the The network agenda reflects the frequency with which the various issues are mentioned simultaneously, but it is important to complete this picture by indicating that most of the references to Trump in June 2017 were already negative. If before, the joint mentions of Trump and sanctions, or Trump and the Crimea had been positive, then these attributes were mentioned together only to state that nothing was changing for the better for Russia.
Discussion
This study was based on the suggestion that the attitude of Russians towards Trump was shaped not so much by some objective conditions, but rather as a result of a particular image designed by the media. We showed that the context in which Trump was discussed changed several times, which correlates well with the Russian media's objective of promoting a certain point of view of U.S.-Russia relations.
During the Cold War, the USSR portrayed the U.S. as "the other", whose hostile attitude could explain the additional investment in the military and the failure of domestic policies. In Russia, the U.S. often continues to play the same role (Ambrosio, 2016) ; however, the media sometimes intentionally demonstrate the similarity of the Russian and the U.S. points of view on certain issues (Gerber, 2015) .
During the U.S. election campaign, the Russian media, which are largely controlled by the government, sought to maintain an image of Trump that would correspond with the political views of Russia's elite. Although Trump was supported by more Russians than Clinton, his image during the election campaign was neutral rather than positive. He, being "a friend of Russia", was portrayed by the Russian media not as a real frontrunner, but as a critic of the U.S.
elite, represented by Clinton. After Trump's defeat, the Russian press could have called the U.S.
election predetermined and the new president's policy manifestly hostile to Russia.
However, Trump unexpectedly won, thereby depriving the Russian media of the opportunity to criticize the election results as predetermined and manifestly anti-Russian. As his name and image remained positive for the Russian people, the media continued to support hopes for some improvement in U.S.-Russia relations. It is possible that the Russian elite, partly shaping Trump's portrayal as a friend of Russia, had been cherishing such hopes for some time.
Russians showed unprecedented levels of interest to the 2016 U.S. presidential election compared with these of previous years, which can be explained by the specifics of the context in which the discussion developed -the scandalous nature of the election and the aggravation of conflict with the U.S., which happened in the last years of the Obama presidency. The media could position this election as important for the future of Russia, as Trump's victory could change the situation for the better. If this "friend of Russia" were to lose, it would better correspond with the role that the Russian media had assigned to him. The real policy of the Trump administration eventually resulted in the need to readjust his image, and he quickly lost the status of a friend and ally. Even his personal meeting with Putin could not make a difference.
Conclusion
This study shows that Trump's activities received very different coverage by the Russian media before and after his victory, and seven months after the election. Trump was proclaimed a friend of Russia only after his victory and did not keep this status for long. Trump was interesting for the Russian press and seemed likable to Russians as a critic of the U.S. elite's political agenda; however, as the President of the U.S., he did not live up to the expectations related, above all, to the withdrawal of political and economic sanctions. 
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In addition, this study shows that a tone analysis of articles can be organically complemented by a comparison of network agendas at different time periods. Trump's position in the Russian press network agenda had been changing following the role and the hopes that were assigned to him.
